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Chapter 2?  
 
Pork price and Mixed Oligopoly Market,  
Corporate Behavior 
 
- Data and Theoretical Analysis - 
 
 
1. Outline of the Hog Slaughtering and Processing Industry 
 
1.1 Industrial Organization and Pricing by Firms 
Increases in pork prices are generally brought about by a shortage of hog production, 
but prices are not set uniformly all over the nation by one entity. Pork is produced by 
the hog slaughtering and processing industry and it is firms in this industry who set the 
market prices of pork. These firms are operating in a market where there exist several 
types of competition. In order to understand the firms’ pricing strategy, it is very useful 
to employ techniques of industrial organization theory to analyze market outcomes 
such as price or quantity.  
 Pricing strategy is a key part of a firm’s decision making and is strongly influenced 
by the competition environment. If all suppliers are small and have no room for 
exercising bargaining power, firms are faced with an identical price level. If 
competition is oligopolistic, price is set by the supplier and in a strategic way. In theory, 
an efficient industrial organization can supply sufficient volumes with the rationally 
lowest price. If something irrational happens in reality, an industrial organization might 
encounter some problems.    
 We will build our hypothesis around what has caused current market outcomes to 
arise, including pork price increases in China. In this paper we are primarily addressing 
the questions of, “What is the pricing policy of hog slaughtering and pork processing 
company”, “Whether the nature of industrial organization matters in pricing behavior”, 
and “How does their sale pricing policy influence procurement policy in regards to 
selection of procurement channels and procurement prices”. In this chapter, we will 
determine the mechanisms working in the market through observation of the market 
outcomes, from our original survey data, and through examining theoretical model.  
   
1.2 Regulations by “Qualified Slaughtering Spot” System 
Prior to going through the data in detail, we reviewed the institutional setting of the 
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industry. In 1998, the “Hog Slaughtering Controlling Ordinance” was endorsed. This 
ordinance provided that each town and village might establish a “Qualified Hog 
Slaughtering Spot Factory” so as to maintain certain hygiene conditions and quality of 
pork. The ordinance also obliged purchasers of hog who supply restaurants, schools, 
hotel, and other public dining areas use only hogs slaughtered at qualified factories.  
 In the mid 1990s, water-injected pork or perished meats were often sold on the market 
disguised as good quality products. In order to eliminate bad meat, a “Qualified 
Slaughtering Spot” system was started. However, when pork price started increasing 
around the middle of 2000, problems with bad meat problem again became a social 
issue.      
 
1.3 Organization of the Industry 
The regulation dubbed the “Qualified Slaughtering Spot” system provides the industry 
with a certain feature where numerous hog slaughtering and pork processing 
companies were set up all over the country. The intention of this measure was to try to 
preserve the quality of pork and provide a convenient slaughtering spot for even the 
small villages. The firms were set up not purely to maximize profit, but also to secure 
the welfare of countryside consumers. Along with development of the industry and 
with economic growth in China, a few companies have grown out of this primary 
welfare stage to become very large corporations, even compared to the international 
counterparts in the 2000s. 
 Due to this institutional setting and historical development, the industry currently 
consists of numerous small-scaled hog slaughtering factories and a few larger 
operations. However, the growth of large companies may have changed the 
competition environment in the industry. Starting from a geographically local 
monopoly, the big firms have stepped out into the realm of nationwide competition. 
Small and locally monopolistic factories are dropping out of the market due to fiercer 
competition conditions in facing the large, nation-wide developed counterparts.  
   
2. Observations from the Hog Slaughtering Firms Survey 
In order to understand the behavior of hog slaughtering and processing firms in China, 
we conducted an original survey in Henan Province, the largest hog production base, 
and Jilin Province, an emerging hog production base, in 2008. Chapter 5 details the 
contents of the survey.  
 
2.1 Main Findings 
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After conducting this firm-level survey, we were able to summarize a number of main 
findings gained through the observations and data on market outcomes of the industry. 
We found that traditional channels, such as wet markets, indirect transactions via 
wholesalers and middlemen, remain the main channels. We also observed that selling 
prices almost converged to the same level, but procurement prices were diversified 
among various channels or provinces. Gross margins between selling price per head 
and procurement price per head were almost zero or negative, except for sales to 
supermarkets. Additionally, we were able to determine that product types were less 
differentiated and no clear differences existed between big and small firms in terms of 
product differentiation. Big firms, however, operated under more competitive 
environments and in a wider area market. These firms were more dependent on 
middleman and enjoyed lower procurement prices. Smaller and medium-sized firms 
tended to operate in localized and monopolized markets and are becoming more 
involved in contract farming. 
 
2.2 Profile of the Surveyed Firms   
The sample of our survey consisted of 103 and 105 firms for Jilin and Henan, 
respectively. The basic profile of the surveyed firms was that most firms were 
relatively young and had a history of only around ten years (year of establishment was 
1997 on average, 2000 median). Also, firms were relatively small with the median 
amount of sales being RMB 1.037 million and assets at RMB 0.58 million. Because 
our sample contained information of Shuanghui, Henan, which is the largest hog 
slaughtering processing company in China, perhaps in the world, averaged data 
becomes very large.  
 The firms were also small in terms of labor, where at the median and average, firms 
had 10 and 173 employees, respectively. The share size of controlling owners tended to 
be concentrated, reflecting small size of the firms. The number of hogs of hogs per 
firm averaged around 59,000, with 4,000 at the median and pork production volumes 
were 300 tons at the median and averaged 4,640 tons. The large difference between 
median and average values showed that the industry was diversified, consisting of 
numerous small and a few very large firms. 
  
 
Table 2-1: Basic Information on the Surveyed Firms 
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(Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey 
 
Comparing Jilin and Henan provinces, we can see that Jilin’s firms tended to be 
smaller in all of the indices examined and were generally younger than those in Henan.  
 
Table 2-2: Jilin and Henan   
(Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey 
 
2.3 Marketing and Procurement Channels and Prices  
2.3.1 Transaction Channels 
In order to gain a rough picture of who traded with whom, we went through the share 
of marketing and procurement channels of pork and hogs. A review of these channels 
showed that the market still maintains traditional characteristics. The main marketing 
channels are the wet market and wholesalers where the procurement of hogs primarily 
depends on middlemen. Sales to restaurants or supermarket, 2% and 5%, respectively, 
by which the firm can expect higher profit via product differentiation with high grade 
meat or stable procurement via contract farming, is very limited and averaged 6.6% in 
the pork production industry in China.  
 The wet market is a marketing channel that has less product differentiation, but is 
spatially monopolized. Technology requirements of this channel are lower than those 
of restaurants or supermarkets. The substantial share of wet market utilization by the 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Year of firm establishment 208 1997 12.6 1954 2000 2008
Sale  (0000RMB:2007) 208 15,608 152,628 0 103.7 2,184,458
Asset (0000 RMB:2007) 208 5,304 31,299 0 58 402,412
Share of controlling owner(%) 199 90.1% 19% 11% 100% 100%
# of employee 207 173 910.4 1 10 12,428
# of hog procured(=slaughtered:head) 204 58,987 230,665 21 4,000 2,267,888
Pork production voluem (ton) 200 4,638 17,736 1 300 153,563
Jilin Henan 
Obs Mean Obs Mean
Year of firm establishment 103 2001 105 1992
Sale  (0000RMB:2007) 103 2,649 105 28,321
Asset (0000 RMB:2007) 103 3,310 105 7,259
Share of controlling owner(%) 103 92.5% 96 87.4%
# of employee 103 75 104 270
# of hog procured(=slaughtered:head) 102 28,751 102 89,222
Pork production voluem (ton) 101 2,301 99 7,023
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surveyed firms implies that though the firms have enjoyed monopoly status at local 
markets, their technology levels, including such things as freezing or cold chain, is not 
high. The prevalence of transactions with middlemen implies that transaction costs 
with numerous hog raising farmers is much larger than agency costs to control the 
middlemen for the most of slaughtering and processing firms.  
 Although the government has stressed upgrading the industry, average institutions 
functioning in the Chinese hog industry have a very traditional look, having not yet 
undertaken modernization or structural transformation processes.  
 
Table 2-3   Shares of Marketing Channels and Procurement Sources 
  (Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey 
 
2.3.2 Price Development   
Next, we will take a look at various price data obtained through our survey. Sales price 
by the marketing channels are listed in Table 2-4 below. Here, we can see that price 
level does not change much between the different marketing channels. Tests of 
significance for the equality of prices were not rejected except in the case of restaurant 
and wet market prices in 2006. On average, firms in the industry were faced with 
identical prices.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obs Mean Obs Mean
Sales ('0000 RMB) 206 5,860 Procured hogs (head) 204 58,987
Share of sales(%) Share of procurement source(%)
Wetmarket 206 58.1% Middleman 204 59.4%
Wholesaler 207 31.6% Own procurement team collect 204 15.4%
Supermarket 206 5.1% Independetn farmer transport 203 13.3%
Brand outlet 206 4.0% Contract farmer 204 6.6%
Restaurant 206 2.0% Others 203 3.5%
Export 206 0.3% Own farm 204 1.9%
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Table 2-4: Sales Price by Marketing Channels 
 (Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey  
 
Procurement prices, however, show a different feature in 2007, where prices from 
middlemen became higher than contracted farmers or independent farmers. Tests of 
significance here on the equality of prices were rejected for prices between middlemen 
and independent farmers and also between middlemen and contracted farmers in 2007. 
The tests on price equality were not rejected for all relationships in 2005 and 2006. In 
2007, procurement prices from the middlemen rose more rapidly than from contracted 
or independent farmers. 
 
Table 2-5: Purchase Price by Procurement Channels 
 (Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey  
 
2.3.3 Price Difference Between Jilin and Henan 
This procurement price diversification was confirmed by in each of the different 
provinces. Sales prices showed little differences between Jilin and Henan provinces, 
but procurement prices showed more diversity. Henan procurement prices were 
significantly higher than Jilin’s. Tests of significance for mean equality of prices 
among marketing channels were not rejected, but the tests on procurement prices 
Price/ head 2007 2006 2005
Procurement source Middleman
Independe
nt farmer
Contracte
d farmer Middleman
Independe
nt farmer
Contracte
d farmer Middleman
Independe
nt farmer
Contracte
d farmer
Mean 1570.4 1512.1 1531.5 1018.1 960.5 1030.6 879.1 817.1 801.6
Std. Deviation 348.1 304.5 338.9 306.5 264.4 309.3 270.1 161.8 198.6
Min 760 730 1000 450 500 580 400 430 450
Max 2800 2500 2500 1980 1800 1800 1980 1250 1250
Obs 157 67 33 143 64 30 135 60 28
t-value to test on the mean equality for paired sample (number in parenthesis is # of observation)
middleman > independen 1.75 (4) -0.64 (43) -0.58 (40)
middleman> contracted 2.41 (24) -0.31 (24) 1.18 (21)
independent>contracted 0.75 (16) 0.58 (16) 0.67 (15)
price/ KG 2007 2006 2005
restaurant supermark wholesale wetmarket restaurant supermarke wholesale wetmarket restaurant supermarke wholesale wetmarket
Mean 20.9 21.1 20.2 19.9 20.5 13.7 13.7 12.7 11.9 11.0 10.8 10.5
Std. Dev 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.4 23.7 3.9 3.0 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.4 2.3
Min 14 14 12 10 11.5 4.8 4.8 4.8 8 5.4 5.2 5.4
Max 29 29 28 34 120 27 26 27 21 21 20 21
Obs 23 47 132 156 20 41 117 141 19 38 108 136
t-value to test on the mean equality for paired sample (number in parenthesis is # of observation)
wholesaler>restaurant -1.94 (19) -1.10 (17) -1.63 (16)
wholesaler>wetmarke 1.25 (85) 0.98 (75) 0.32 (72)
wholesaller>supermar 0.27 (36) -0.66 (35) -0.25 (29)
restaurant>supermark -0.12 (18) 1.00 (15) -1.00 (14)
restaurant>wetmarket -0.22 (14) 2.21 (13) 1.81 (13)
supermarket>wetmark 0.81 (3) 0.08 1 1.76 (28)
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showed significant differences among all pairs of the three procurement sources. 
 
Table 2-6: Price Differences between Jilin and Henan 
 (Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey  
 
Price data showed that the selling prices of pork were almost the same among different 
marketing channels and provinces and that procurement prices were diversified among 
different procurement sources and provinces. This implies that firms in the Chinese 
hog industry are being faced with a perfect competitive market and identical prices, 
thus profit is mainly generated from differences in procurement costs.  
 
 
2.4 Demand: Poorly Differentiated Product and Localized Demand 
Demand for products of the hog slaughtering and processing firms can be classified 
according to “types of products” and “market area”.  
 
2.4.1 Product Types 
In our survey, hog processing firm products were classified into the following four 
types: (1) fresh cleaned hog body; (2) frozen split meat; (3) chilled split meat; and (4) 
processed or cooked pork. Generally speaking, fresh cleaned hog bodies are the 
simplest products, just having slaughtered, cleansed the hog body, and then sold them 
directly. Freezing meat requires relatively simple technology, but consumers regard it 
as lower grade meat compared to chilled or fresh products. Chilled meat requires the 
highest level of technology among these four types in terms of storage or distribution. 
Finally, processed or cooked meat is regarded as a different product from the “pork” 
Sales price (per KG) Hog purchase price (per head)
2007 restaurant supermarket wholesaler wetmarket Middleman
Independen
t farmer
Contracte
d farmer
Henan
Mean 21.0 21.6 20.7 20.1 1,718 1,576 1,620
Std. Dev 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.6 404 318 322
Obs 19 22 70 65 72 45 26
Jilin
Mean 20.4 20.6 19.7 19.7 1,445 1,382 1,202
Std. Dev 1.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 229 230 139
Obs 4 25 62 91 85 22 22
Mean price difference
Henan-Jilin 0.62 0.95 1.00 0.39 273 193 418
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products above.  
 Among sales to wet markets and wholesalers, the largest marketing channels of our 
surveyed firms, the share of fresh cleaned hog body took up more than 60 and 90%. 
Chilled pork’s share was around 20% (3. plus 3+others in Table 2-7), excluding the wet 
market. Restaurants were the customers who needed the highest grade of meat and half 
of them bought chilled meats. As a whole, product types of the hog slaughtering and 
processing industry are still poorly differentiated, though technological innovation is 
now progressing.    
 
Table 2-7: Type of Products Sold to Customers 
 (Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey 
 
2.4.2 Distance From the Customer 
Along with product differentiation by product type as addressed in the section above, 
spatial differentiation might influence competition in the industry. This survey has also 
obtained information on firms’ distance from each customer. Here, we can see that 
transactions with wet markets were particularly spatially localized. Around 70% of 
customers were located within 3 km from the slaughtering and processing firms. On 
the contrary, wholesalers distribute the products to a wider range of markets. Around 
half of the wholesalers were located within 3 km from the firms, but 17% of them were 
located from 500km to 5000km away from the firms. As a whole, wet markets cover 
local markets and wholesalers distribute to wider areas. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Wholesaler Restaurant Supermarket Wet market 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
1. Fresh cleaned body 86 57% 6 25% 24 67% 133 90%
2. Frozon split body 30 20% 2 8% 2 6% 3 2%
3. Chilled split body 17 11% 11 46% 6 17% 4 3%
4. Processed meat 2 1% 1 4% 0 0% 1 1%
1+2 or 1+2+4 3 2% 1 4% 1 3% 0 0%
3+others 12 8% 3 13% 2 6% 8 5%
Total 150 100% 24 100% 36 100% 147 100%
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Table 2-8: Distance From Customers 
 (Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey 
 
The data above in Table 2-8 shows inter-regional transactions. We can see that the  
products have just begun to be differentiated, but this is currently very limited. The 
production of hogs by the surveyed firms is very homogenous and spatially 
oligopolized.  
 
2.5 Supply: Very Few Big Processors and Numerous “Policy Qualified Factories”  
Profiles of the surveyed firms showed that the industry consists of a few big processors 
and numerous small factories. Figure 2-1 shows the distribution of the surveyed firms 
by number of hogs slaughtered. The larger sized firms belong to “tail” part of the 
distribution with smaller firms belonging to “peak” part of the distribution.  
 
Figure 2- 1: Distribution of the Surveyed Firms by Number of Hogs Slaughtered 
(Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey 
(Note) Width of a bin is 50,000 head.  
  
We have taken a look at the firms’ strategies by comparing those of top firms and those 
Wholesaler Restaurant Supermarket Wet market
KM cum # cum% KM cum # cum% KM cum # cum% KM cum # cum%
1 24 19% 1 3 13% 1 8 17% 1 39 26%
3 59 46% 3 6 25% 3 20 42% 3 104 68%
10 75 59% 15 12 50% 10 30 63% 10 135 89%
50 87 69% 40 20 83% 50 43 90% 50 147 97%
540 105 83% 500 23 96% 500 47 98% 500 151 99%
5000 127 100% 600 24 100% 1006 48 100% 1006 152 100%
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of the whole sample. “Top firms” are defined as the top 15 firms in terms of number of 
hog procured and slaughtered in the surveyed sample.  
 
2.5.1 Firms’ Strategies 
Under this section we will take a look at price, product type, and shares of marketing 
and procurement channels.  
 
(1) Price 
Are review of industry prices yielded an interesting result in that the selling price was 
almost the same between the top 10 firms and the whole sample. However, the 
procurement prices turned out to be different and prices for the top 15 firms was lower 
than the whole sample or smaller firms. 
 
Table 2-9:  Prices of Top 15 firms 
 (Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey  
 
(2) Product Type 
Configurations of product types by marketing channels showed no significant 
differences in the sample as a whole. Chilled and fresh meats are sold to restaurants 
and supermarkets and fresh meat is sold to the wet markets. The wholesalers buy more 
diversified products, fresh meat, frozen meat, chilled meat, and combinations of all. All 
types of firms have the configuration as above and in this regard, product are less 
differentiated. 
 
(3) Procurement and Marketing Sources’ Share 
Shares of procurement sources were different throughout the whole sample. In order to 
Selling price
Obs Mean Obs Mean
Wholesaler 15 20.7 132 20.2
Restaurant 5 21.9 23 20.9
Supermarket 9 21.8 47 21.1
Wetmarket 8 18.9 156 19.9
Procurement price
Obs Mean Obs Mean
Contract farmer 9 1,422 36 1,522
Independent farmer 9 1,448 71 1,492
Middleman 12 1,316 191 1,561
Top 15 firms Total
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remove the impacts of large sized firms, we split the sample into two parts consisting 
of the top 15 in terms of hog slaughtered and then the rest.  
 An interesting point here was that on average, smaller groups depended more on 
contract farmers for their hog sources. The top 15 firms depended on middleman twice 
more than contract farmers. Among the top 15 firms, the smaller firms depended more 
on contract farmers with the smaller sized firms in the larger group being more actively 
involved in contract farming, probably in order to secure their hogs under competition 
with the larger firms. 
 
Table 2-10: Shares of Marketing and Procurement Channels 
(Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey  
 
(4) Number of competitor 
Another interesting point was the difference in competition environments. The survey 
had information about the number of competitors as classified into seven grades (1 - no 
competitors, 2 - 1 to 5 competitors, 3 - 5 to 10 competitors, 4 - 10 to 30 competitors, 
and 7 - 100+ competitors). As Table 2-11 shows, larger firms had more competitors 
than smaller groups, averaging 5 to 30 and 1 to 10 competitors, respectively. Other 
than this, data on distances from customers shows that larger groups’ customers are 
located farther away than for smaller firms. Larger firms were operating under a more 
competitive environment and in a wider market area. On the contrary, the smaller firms 
were operating in a localized and monopolized market.  
 
 
 
 
Marketing channels
Obs Mean Obs Mean
Wholesaler 15 5,553,761 115 305,114
Restaurant 5 68,439 18 74,100
Supermarket 9 479,163 38 79,622
Wetmarket 8 564,887 148 282,845
Procurement sources
Obs Mean Obs Mean
Contract farmer 9 47,641 27 5,789
Independent farmer 9 10,442 62 2,134
Middleman 12 82,977 151 2,438
Top 15 No.16 and below
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Table 2-11: Competition in Marketing and Procurement 
(Source) CAAS-IDE Jilin Henan Hog Industry Survey  
 
(5) Margins for processing firms 
The question we must now consider is, “under the competitive environment above, are 
the surveyed firms able to make a profit?” We calculated information for gross margins 
by taking the selling price minus the procurement price per head of livestock. Profits 
for slaughtering one head of livestock by each of the marketing channels are listed in 
Table 2-12. Strikingly, only sale to supermarkets was profitable at gross margins in the 
whole sample in 2007. The hog processing industry was operating under severe 
conditions. The top 15 firms were remaining profitable thanks to low procurement 
costs.  
 
Table 2-12: Profit per Head of Hogs 
Number of competitor to the customers
Obs Mean Obs Mean
Wholesaler 11 3.3 129 2.3
Restaurant 5 3.4 22 2.3
Supermarket 5 3.2 47 2.3
Wetmarket 8 3.0 155 1.7
Number of potential competitor
Obs Mean Obs Mean
Contract farmer 9 3.1 34 3.3
Independent farmer 9 3.3 71 2.5
Middleman 11 3.2 191 2.1
TotalTop 15 firms
Obs Mean Obs Mean
Sales price  per head
Wholesaler 13 1,539 108 1,506
Wetmarket 7 1,328 138 1,521
Supermarket 7 1,643 38 1,637
Restaurant 4 1,806 19 1,476
Average procurement price per head*
P_avg 14 1,380 166 1,571
Profit  per head
Wholesaler 12 129 101 -1.4
Wetmarket 7 21 135 -19.5
Supermarket 6 258 36 98.6
Restaurant 3 355 18 -41.9
Top 15 Whole sample
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(Source) CAAS Jilin and Henan Hog Industry Survey. 
(Note) The survey obtained information on sales price per KG and procurement price per head. Sales 
price per head was obtained by sales price per KG multiplied by meat ratio (pork sales volume / number 
of head procured). The data above is limited to those with a meat ratio that ranges from 40 to 150. The 
survey also included information regarding source channels of hogs for each marketing counterpart. The 
margin is obtained by taking the difference between sales price to each customer and paired 
procurement source.  
 
3. Hog Price and Mixed Oligopoly: A Theoretical Analysis  
 
3.1 Mixed Oligopoly 
As described in the previous sections, the hog slaughtering and processing industries 
were set up with a purpose to improve social welfare in the 1990s under the “Qualified 
Factory” system. Thus, firms were motivated to pursue improving social welfare as 
well as profit. The mixed oligopoly approach has studied what the industrial 
organization will look like with heterogeneous types of firms, a profit maximizer and a 
social welfare maximizer. Matsushima and Matsumura (2004) and Kumar and Saha 
(2007) analyzed spatial and price competition with homogenous goods. Matsumura 
and Matsushima (1998) and Kumar et al (2007) also analyzed the impact of partial 
privatization of price levels, quantity, and social welfare in industry.    
 Though most firms in the industry being set up with as social welfare maximizing, the 
pork production industry in China is facing a dynamic structural transformation. A 
mixed oligopoly approach is therefore very suitable for describing the current hog 
industry in China. In addition, this analysis focuses on spatial competition of 
homogenous goods based on features observed in our survey above. We will describe a 
mixed oligopoly, duopoly in this case, model by re-interpreting Matsushima and 
Matsumura (2004). 
 
3.2 The Model   
For our analysis, we considered a linear city model with a length of 1 and consumers 
that are uniformly distributed with density 1 along this line. A location of Firm i is set 
as li????????which is a point on the line at a distance from the left end of the line. 
Here we assume l0<l1, as the opposite relationship only generates symmetric results. 
We also assume that Firm 0 is a social welfare maximizer and Firm 1 is a profit 
maximizer.  
 
3.2.1 The Consumer 
The consumer living at y??????buys a product from Firm 0 if c0 < c1, where ci is cost 
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to buy a product of Firm i and ci=pi+t(li - y)2 . Cost to buy a product of Firm i consists 
of the price of the product, pi, and the transportation cost of the consumer to travel to 
an outlet of Firm i, t(li - y)2 (t>0)??Following the literature of location choice theory, 
we assumed that transportation cost was a function of the square of the distance1. The 
consumer enjoys their utility and surplus from the consumption was Ui=s-ci. 
 The consumer at point x on the line is where utility from Firm 0 products and Firm 1 
products is the same and the consumer will be indifferent between the products from 
either. The consumer located between point 0 and point x will buy the product of Firm 
0 and the consumer who is located between point x and point 1 will buy the product of 
Firm 1. Thus, demand for the product of Firm i will be given by follows:  
D0 = min{max (x, 0),1},  
D1=1-D0. 
  
   From U1=U0, the indifferent location x is derived as follows:  
x = (l0+l1)/2+(v1-v0)/2t(l1-l0)    (1) 
 
Figure 2-2: Cost of Consumers and Distance from Firms 
    Firm 0   tx2        x t(1-x)2 Firm 1 
 
(Source) Author 
 
3.2.2 The Firm 
In this market, we consider a welfare-maximizing firm (Firm 0) is competing with a 
profit-maximizing firm (Firm 1). Firm 0 and Firm 1 produce a homogenous good. The 
unit cost of production for each firm is pi, which is subject to cost reduction efforts by 
the firms at cost Ii. For simplicity, we assume Ii=?(p-pi)2  (?>0). The cost of this 
reduction is common between Firm 0 and Firm 1 and there are no ex ante cost 
differences between the two. 
 The game runs in following manner. In the first stage each Firm i choose their 
production cost level, pi simultaneously, in the second stage firms choose their 
                                                  
1 Distance from the locations of consumers and firms is lower than 1/2, as we only 
consider cases when l0<l1.  
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locations, and in the third stage the firms set their price vi?????) simultaneously. 
The difference of Firm 0 and Firm 1 comes from their objective functions. Firm 1’s 
objective is to maximize profit. Thus, its objective function is: 
  ?1= (v1-p1) (1-D1) - I1 . 
On the other hand, Firm 0 is motivated to maximize social welfare as long as its profit 
plus initial asset, A0, is positive. The objective function of the social 
welfare-maximizing firm is,      
W= s- p0D0-p1(1-D1)-I0-I1- t( ( ) ( )∫∫ −+− 1 21
0
2
0
0
0
D
D
dylydyly ), 
subject to ?0+A 0= (v0-p0) (1-D0) - I0+A0>=0. 
 
3.2.3 The Equilibrium 
This section discusses the equilibrium outcome in the mixed market as formulated 
above with the game being solved through backward induction.  
 
(1) Pricing  
First, we consider the third stage sub-game. Firm 0 will set p0 so as to maximize social 
welfare W, and Firm 1 will set price v1 to maximize its profit ?? . First order 
conditions for the two firms reduces the price functions as follows: 
    
     v0 = 2p0-p1+t(l1-l0)(2-l0-l1),       
     v1 = p0+t(l1-l0)(2-l0-l1)           (2).                
Here,  
     v0-v1=p0-p1  holds. 
 
Proposition on Pricing Behavior: The pricing principle is asymmetry. Firm 1 sets its 
price based on Firm 0’s costs. Firm 1 will set price so as to keep a selling price 
difference, v0-v1, as the same as cost difference p0-p1. 
 
(2) Location Choice 
Next, we will consider the second stage, location choice. Substituting (1) into the 
objective functions W and ??, we can derive first order conditions for Firm 0 and 
Firm 1. First, when (1) holds, demand for Firm 0 and Firm 1 is divided as follows by 
substituting (2) into (1): 
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  x = (t(l12-l02)+p1-p0)/2t(l1-l0).     (1)’ 
Location choice depends on the efficiency difference of Firm 0 and Firm 1. Firm 0 is 
motivated to make decisions to maximize social welfare and its location choice will 
determine the configuration of location choice in the industry. Thus, if Firm 0 is more 
efficient than Firm 1 for all consumers, that is c0<c1 or (c0-c1)/{(1-l0)2-(1-l1)2}<t, Firm 
0 will choose:  
l0=1/2, l1=1,  
and set a low price so as to induce an efficient outcome. Given this strategy, Firm 1 
will stay as far away as possible from Firm 0.  
 On the other hand, if Firm 1 is more efficient than Firm 0 for all consumers, that is 
c1<c0 or t<(p0-p1)/(l12-l02), Firm 0 and 1 will choose:  
l0=0, l1=1/2, 
where firm 0 will set a high price so as to induce a monopoly by Firm 1.  
 If neither case is chosen, that is (p0-p1)/(l12-l02) ?t?(p0-p1)/{(1-l0)2-(1-l1)2} when a 
mixed oligopoly is taking place, Firm 0 will choose a location so as to maximize W, 
and Firm 1 will choose to maximize its profit. With the first order conditions of these 
two objectives, we can derive best response functions on location choice:  
       
l0 = (4p1-4p0+t)/4t,          
      l1 = (4p1-4p0+3t)/4t      (3). 
 
Proposition on Location Choice: In the case where the cost difference between the 
social welfare maximizer and the profit maximizer is large enough, a monopoly of 
either will take place. If efficiency differences are not large enough to overcome 
transportation costs, Firms 0 and 1 will choose locations by keeping a distance of 1/22. 
 
                                                  
2 In case of a circular city model where we can analyze endogenously the entry of firms, profit 
maximizer firms will be located at the maximal differences. In this setting, social maximizing 
firms are operating monopolistically at one point, profit maximizer firms are located at the 
opposite point of the circle, and several numbers of firms will be agglomerated (Matsushima 
and Matsuura (2004: Concluding Remarks). This is consistent with an observation from the 
survey in Table 2-11 that big firms were faced with competition, but small firms enjoyed a 
local monopoly.  
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(3) Cost Reduction Level at Full Game  
Finally, we will discuss decisions on investment for production cost reduction. We will 
see the results for the three cases above.  
 If the cost of the social welfare-maximizing firm is absolutely lower than the private 
firm, that is (p0-p1)/{(1-l0)2-(1-l1)2}<t, then Firm 0 will monopolize the market and set 
price v0 as low as possible. The objective of Firm 0 is to maximize W via product cost 
reduction. The first order condition is given as: 
 p0*=p-1/2????p1*=p. 
Here,  v0* = p-1/?+t/4, v1* = p+t/4, ?0=  t/4 -3/4?? ?1=0.?
? As Firm 1 is not interested in taking a market share here, Firm 1 does not invest in 
cost reductions and sets a price higher than Firm 0. 
 If c1<c0 or t<(p0-p1)/(l12-l02), then a monopoly by the profit maximizing firm will 
occur. The firm will set a monopolized, high price with the other result being 
symmetry with the social welfare maximizer’s monopoly: 
    p1*=p-1/2?????
*????
      v0*= p+1/?+3t/4, v1*= p+3t/4, ?0=0, ?1= t/4 +3/4?? 
 
If (p0-p1)/(l12-l02) ? t ? (p0-p1)/{(1-l0)2-(1-l1)2}, when neither production cost 
difference or difference in transportation cost by location choice is dominant, a mixed 
oligopoly takes place. In this case, location, selling price, cost, and profits of the firms 
are as follows: 
l0 = (4p1-4p0+t)/4t= )5(2
3
4
1
−− γt , l1 = (4p1-4p0+3t)/4t= )5(2
3
4
3
−− γt  
    p0* = p - )5(4
8
−
−
γγ
γ
t
t  > p1*=p - )5(
2
−
−
γγ
γ
t
t , 
v0*=p0+2(p0-p1)+t/2 =p+ 2)5(2
)4( t
t
t +−
−
γγ
γ > v1*= p0+(p0-p1)+t/2=p- 2)5(
2 t
t
+−γγ .  
D0*= )5(2
3
2
1
−− γt . 
      ?0*= }16
)8(
4
)2({
)5(
)8(
2 λ
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γ
γ −−−−
− ttt
t
t < ?1*= )
1
4
(
)5(
)2(
2
2
λγ
γ −−
− t
t
t  (4) 3.  
                                                  
3When we assume (p0-p1)/(l12-l02) ?t?(p0-p1)/{(1-l0)2-(1-l1)2}, monopoly by either the 
profit maximization firm or social welfare-maximizing firm does not happen, t?>8 holds, from 
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Both production cost and selling price of the profit-maximizing firm are lower than the 
social welfare-maximizing firm. The profit-maximizing firm invests more in cost 
reduction and then generates larger cost differences with social welfare maximizer. The 
social welfare-maximizing firm may respond by locating itself as far as possible from 
profit-maximizing firm and setting a higher price in order to increase social welfare. 
Thus, the profit maximizer has an incentive to strategically lower production cost and 
to reduce the investment by the public firm, which is a strategically substitutive 
commitment. Matsushima and Matsuura (2004) assert that the profit-maximizing 
firm’s cost reduction is excessive compared to that of the social planner’s.  
 
Proposition on Cost Reduction: If either Firm 0 or 1 is the monopolist, only a 
monopolist will make cost reduction investments. Ex post production cost level is the 
same regardless who is the monopolist. When monopolies are taking place, the 
profit-maximizing firm will set a higher selling price when he monopolizes the market. 
When both of them stay in a market, the profit-maximizing firm reduces costs more 
than social welfare firms.  
 
Figure 2-3: Locations, consumer utility and market share at equilibrium 
 
 
(Source) Author 
 
In this paper, we are interested in how prices of products and procurement are set by 
the firms. We can summarize the model prediction on pricing as the following 
                                                                                                                                                  
D0= )5(2
3
2
1
−− γt >0 and t?>2  from D0= )5(2
3
2
1
−− γt <1.
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propositions.  
 
Proposition on Selling and Production Cost at Equilibrium: The selling price of the 
social welfare maximizer and profit maximizer is diversified if  a difference in 
production cost exists. The social welfare maximization firm will set a higher price 
than the profit maximizer within the extent of production cost differences, though he 
chooses a location so as to minimize the transportation cost of the consumer and 
improving consumer welfare4. 
 
Figure 2-4 Selling price and distance 
 
(Source) Author 
 
Comparing monopoly equilibriums, the selling price of products in a mixed oligopoly 
is higher than the price at equilibrium of a monopoly by the social welfare-maximizing 
firm, but lower than the profit maximizer’s monopoly. Competition is desirable to 
lower the expenditure of the consumer and monopoly by the profit maximizer will 
induce a higher product price. 
          v0profit maximizer monopoly = p+1/?+3t/4 
> v0mixed oligopoly = p+ 2)5(2
)4( t
t
t +−
−
γγ
γ  
> v0social welfare maximizer monopoly = p-1/?+t/4  (5) 5. 
For production cost, the cost level of the social welfare maximizer in a mixed 
                                                  
4 A mixed oligopoly analysis (Kumar and Saha, 2007) stated that the presence of a social 
welfare-maximizing firm brought about a low consumer price.  
5 The latter relationship hold when t?>8. 
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oligopoly is higher than that of two monopoly equilibriums, but the production cost of 
the profit maximizer is lower than in the monopoly case. Competition is good to 
reduce production costs and increase the efficiency of the industry even in a mixed 
oligopoly concept. 
p0* = p - )5(4
8
−
−
γγ
γ
t
t  >?p-1/2???p1*=p - )5(
2
−
−
γγ
γ
t
t  (6) . 
(4) Financial Sustainability of a Social Welfare Maximizer 
The profit level of a social welfare maximizer stays lower than a profit maximizer in 
the mixed oligopoly from (4). Though the unit margin v0-p0=v1-p1 holds the same, the 
lower the production cost of the profit maximizer, the larger the market share of the 
profit maximizer as the social welfare gives up the market. The more aggressive the 
profit maximizer is in terms of cost reduction investment, the smaller the market share 
and the higher the selling price of social welfare maximizer. This mechanism is 
progressive and if the game is repeated in multiple periods, the social welfare 
maximizer may exit the market except in a market where transportation costs are 
substantially high. 
 If production cost p0 increases due to an exogenous reason such as a labor cost 
increase, then the selling price of a social welfare maximizer products’ will increase 
rapidly, as the cost difference is exaggerated due to the firm’s own exogenous reasons. 
This implies that the price of pork supplied by a social welfare maximizer is more 
vulnerable to increasing labor costs, which is what is currently happening.   
    
3.3 Data on Selling Price Dispersion  
The model above predicted that if the social welfare maximizer and the profit 
maximizer are operating in a market, the social welfare maximizer will choose the 
location so as to minimize the transportation cost that the consumer bears, but will set 
selling prices higher if there is a cost difference between the two firms. When this 
mixed oligopoly takes place, the product price level is diversified where the social 
welfare-maximizing firm, who sells products close to its location, sets a higher price 
and the profit maximizer, who enters farther away from the initial location of the 
former, sets lower prices. 
 This result implies that price is diversified according to the distance from the firm to 
the customers. Figure 2-5 shows the dispersion of prices of the whole sample, and 
sub-samples within; completely homogenous goods, here fresh pork; and the type of 
customer, in this case wet markets. We can observe here that there exist a correlation 
between selling price and distance. Selling price is lower the longer the distance to the 
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customer within completely homogenous products or the same customer type (Figure 
2-5b, 2-5c), though price is independent to the distance in the whole sample (Figure 
2-5a or previous sections).  
 The model describes an interaction between the social welfare maximizer and the 
profit maximizer. Our survey does not have information to directly distinguish this 
heterogeneity of firms’ motivation, but we assume “big firms” are profit maximizers 
who have grown out of the initial purpose and currently pursue the maximization of 
profits and “small firms” are social welfare maximizers that maintain the motivation 
instilled during their establishment. Figure 2-5d and 2-5e show the price dispersion of 
two sub-samples split into the top 15 and below as we did in the previous section. 
Small firms’ prices are relatively more scattered including higher levels and the prices 
of big firm have converged to a lower level, though mean prices are almost the same.   
 22
Figure 2-5: Price Dispersion 
Figure 2-5a: Whole Sample  
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Figure 2-5b: Fresh Cleaned Body     Figure 2-5c: To Wet Markets  
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Figure 2-5d: No. 16th and below     2-5e:  Top 15   
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(Source) CAAS Jilin and Henan hog industry survey. 
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The figures above look consistent with the prediction of a mixed oligopoly and 
location choice model in this section. A rigorous statistical test is necessary to fully 
examine the hypothesis.  
  
4. Summary and Conclusion  
In order to explore the mechanism that brought about the increase of pork prices, we 
focused on and analyzed the pricing behavior of hog slaughtering and processing firms 
based on an industrial organization approach. 
 Observation of the data and the institutions in the previous section indicated that the 
hog slaughtering and processing industry produced less differentiated products and has 
developed a spatial competition. Also, most of the firms were established to secure the 
social welfare of the consumers in rural areas in the 1990s. The objective of some 
firms, particularly part of the small firms, still remains as to consider primarily social 
welfare, though the big firms appear to behave as purely pursuing profit. There are 
firms with heterogeneous objectives operating in a hog slaughtering and processing 
market.  
 Based on this basic observation, we referred to a mixed oligopoly analysis on the 
spatial competition of homogenous goods as a theory to analyze the market. The model 
predicted that social welfare-motivated firms will reduced their market share and will 
set a higher product-selling price in response to aggressive cost reduction investment. 
Thus, cost differences between profit maximizers and social welfare maximizers have 
emerged. This endogenous cost difference may be brought about the financial distress 
of social welfare-maximizing firms.  
 Our data showed that the selling price of the products was less dispersed, but the 
procurement price of hogs shares a substantial part of production costs and is 
apparently significantly different between bigger and smaller firms. Big firms, who are 
more strongly motivated to maximize profits, looked more aggressive in reducing costs, 
which is consistent with model prediction above. Small firms are now operating at a 
deficit even at a gross margin per head of hogs. The social welfare-maximizing 
principle of the “Qualified Slaughtering Factory” system now seems to be eroding. 
 The model also predicted selling prices and distance between supplier and consumer 
where the closer to the social welfare maximizer, the higher the price is set compared 
to a neighborhood producer or the profit maximizers. Though product price dispersion 
was not so apparent as the procurement price, it showed a correlation with the distance 
between suppliers and consumers. “Small firms” prices were more dispersed and 
included higher levels than “big firms”.  
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As a whole, the data observations and model predictions may explain current pork 
price increase. Other than labor cost increases, the nature of the mixed oligopoly 
market accelerated price increases, particularly in the rural areas. Also, the larger firms, 
the profit maximizers, aggressively pursed cost reductions, but the smaller firm, social 
welfare maximizers with smaller market shares, had higher products prices. If a 
monopolistic system by the big firms, or the profit maximizers, becomes prevalent, the 
selling price of pork may increase even more, as the profit maximizer will set an 
equally high price. A sustainable competitive environment is necessary for the efficient 
development of the industry.  
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